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SALE-LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS BY
TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES AND THE NEED FOR
CONGRESSIONAL GUIDELINES
I. Introduction
Legislation is pending in Congress to restrict transactions in which
tax-exempt entities1 sell properties to private investors who in turn
lease them back. 2 The primary issue presented by the proposed legisla-
tion is whether tax benefits associated with leasing should indirectly
be allowed to tax-exempt entities. 3 The proposed legislation decreases
depreciation allowances for property leased to tax-exempt institutions
(tax-exempt use property) from the current, accelerated system 4 to the
1. The bills define, with slight variations between the earlier House and Senate
versions, "tax-exempt entity" to include federal, state, local, and foreign govern-
ments, possessions of the U.S., international organizations and certain of their instru-
mentalities, and certain foreign persons, as well as most organizations that are
exempt from federal income tax. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564 (GOVERNMENTAL LEASE FINANCING
REFORM ACT OF 1983) RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PROPERTY LEASED TO TAX-
EXEMPT ENTITIES (Joint Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as DESCRIPTION OF S.
1564]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., IST SESs., DE-
scRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PROPERTY USED BY NON-
TAXABLE ENTITIES (Joint Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as DESCRIPTION OF
H.R. 3110]; HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., TAX REFORM ACT OF 1983, H.R. 4170,
98TH CONG., 1ST SESs., reprinted in STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) (extra ed. Oct. 25,
1983) [hereinafter cited as DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON TAX ASPECTS OF FEDERAL
LEASING ARRANGEMENTS (Joint Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter cited as TAX AS-
PECTS].
2. H.R. 3110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1564, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
3. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 62. Secondary issues include the
efficiency of sale-leasebacks as a financial device, the lack of neutrality in the tax
system in the decision whether to own or lease by tax-exempt entities, the privatiza-
tion of public services, a distortion of the appropriation process, a lack of account-
ability in the budgets of federal agencies, and negative public perceptions. See
DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12-14; discussion infra in notes 102-04 and
accompanying text.
4. See I.R.C. § 168(a) (1976). See also, DEPRECIATION GUIDE (CCH) 100-04
(Tax Analysis Series 1983) [hereinafter cited as DEPRECIATION GUIDE] (ACRS was
created to provide further incentives to stimulate capital investment since "inflation
had diminished the value of previous depreciation allowances, and the need to
upgrade technology had further increased the cost of replacing older equipment") Id.
at 100. FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 2004 (Prentice-Hall 1983) [hereinafter cited as
TAX HANDBOOK] (cost of "recovery property", depreciable property placed in service
after 1980, will generally be recovered under accelerated cost recovery system, over
prescribed period by using statutory accelerated methods); SYCIP AND ALINDADA,
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straight-line method 5 in an attempt to reduce what are in effect
federal subsidies flowing to tax-exempt entities through the use of sale-
leasebacks.6 The bills also include criteria for determining whether to
allow investment tax credits (ITCs) 7 in property transactions involv-
ing tax-exempt entities. s
Depreciation, in, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 22-14 (L.J. Seidler & D.R. Carmichael
eds. 1981) (decreasing charge method used to allocate a greater value to asset initially
with this value diminishing proportionately over time).
5. See SEIDLER & CARMICHAEL, supra note 4, at 22-11 (straight-line method of
allocating depreciation "is a function of the passage of time and recognizes equal
periodic charges over the service life of the asset" and thus "is not affected by asset
productivity, efficiency, or degree of use").
6. See DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 17-18; DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
3110, supra note 1, at 16-17; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 72-74.
Under the Senate version, the recovery period is lengthened, for example, from the
current 15-year real property ACRS class to 40 years or 125 percent of the lease term,
whichever is greater. Under the House version, a set of extended recovery periods is
set out in an attempt to give the tax-exempt entity leasing an asset from a taxable
entity the same tax treatment accorded property owners. This result is clearly de-
signed to conform with the Committees' idea of the principle of neutrality, detailed
infra in note 111 and the accompanying text. The primary factor motivating this
legislation is revenue loss to the Treasury at a time of federal deficits through what is
termed by the congressional committees an indirect federal subsidy to tax-exempt
entities and their taxpaying partners in sale-leasebacks. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 64.
7. See I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48 (1976). See, e.g.,S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3304, 3304. This
Senate Finance Committee report concerning the introduction of the investment tax
credit in 1962 states that the ITC was designed to encourage modernization and
expansion of the nation's productive facilities, improve the economic potential of the
country, and increase job opportunities by stimulating investment. This was to be
accomplished by (1) reducing the net cost of acquiring depreciable assets, which in
turn would increase the rate of return after taxes arising from their acquisition; and
(2) increasing the flow of cash, thereby making investment decisions easier since they
are in large part influenced by the availability of funds. POLICY READINGS IN INDIVID-
UAL TAXATION 311, 313 (Philip F. Postlewaite ed. 1980).
8. See S. 1564, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) See also infra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text; DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 17-20; DESCRIPTION OF
H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 16-18; DESCRIPrION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 74-75;
S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3304; POLICY READINGS IN INDIVIDUAL TAXATION (Philip F. Postlewaite
ed. 1980) AT 312 (legislative history of ITC).
The congressional policy originally reflected in extension of the nontaxable use
restriction to cover non-governmental tax-exempt entities was to prevent the flow
through to a taxpayer of this benefit based on a tax-exempt's use of the property. S.
Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3304, 3304-05. Purported service contracts under the nontaxable use
restrictions on the ITC remain largely undisturbed. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra
note 1, at 75. The legislation will require a particularized factual inquiry into
matters such as the degree of control exerted by the tax-exempt entity and the extent
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This Note explores the use, mechanics, and financial and tax ramifi-
cations of sale-leaseback transactions, focusing on their growing use
by tax-exempt entities and the concerns this use has created in Con-
gress.' This analysis demonstrates that these transactions do not pose
the problems feared by Congress, the Treasury Department (IRS),
and the current Administration.10 Furthermore, it will be shown that
under most circumstances sale-leaseback transactions by tax-exempt
entities, although causing a revenue loss, are a useful device for pro-
viding certain tax-exempt entities with the financial means to main-
tain services in the face of rising costs and the withdrawal of federal
funding. 11 Finally, this Note proposes the legitimization of the use of
sale-leasebacks by tax-exempt entities and adoption of guidelines
of its possessory or economic interest. Id. at 74-75. A three-part test is given in which
ITC will be denied if all of the following factors are present in a transaction: (1)
property is used primarily to provide services for a tax-exempt entity for a large
portion of the useful life (or value) of the property; (2) the tax-exempt entity bears the
risk of loss of the property's residual value; and (3) the tax-exempt entity bears the
risk of damage to or loss of the property during the term of the lease. Id. at 75-76. It
should be noted that under the present law this situation would possibly also cause
denial of the ITC. Id. at 74. This test could also cause the tax-exempt entity to be
declared the owner for federal income tax purposes, eliminating depreciation deduc-
tions. Id. at 75. The ITC may be allowed where property is used in such a way that
the economic benefits and burdens of ownership are split between the tax-exempt
and a taxable entity. Id. at 76-77.
9. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. For example, the House Ways
and Means Committee noted its concern that:
investment incentives that were intended to reduce the tax on taxable
entities have been turned into unintended benefits for tax-exempt entities,
including foreign entities. The benefits are equivalent to an open-ended
spending program, operated within the tax system, that increases the
Federal deficit, encourages tax-exempt entities to dispose of the assets they
own and forego control over the assets they use, disorders public budgeting
processes, and feeds a popular perception that the tax system is open to
manipulation.
DEscrUPTxON OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 62. See also A Tax-Leasing Twist That Is
In Trouble, Bus. WK. 57 (July 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Tax-Leasing Twist]
("Leasing by nonprofit organizations has boomed to the point where the Treasury
argues that it will lose $14 billion in tax receipts over the next five years unless
something is done"); College Leasing Deals Are Target of Proposal to Clamp Down
on "Costly Tax Shelters," 26 CHRON. oF HIGHER EDUC. 13 (June 29, 1983) (Rep. J.J.
Pickle (D. Tex.), in introducing bill to House Ways and Means Committee, called the
leasing arrangements "one of the most unusual, ingenious, and costly tax shelters that
we've seen in years"); Growth of Tax-Exempt Financing Stirs Battle on Revenues and
Rights, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, at § 2, at 37, col. 4 ("tax-exempt financing has
spread into areas where it doesn't belong...").
10. See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text for discussion of relevant
issues perceived by the Joint Committee on Taxation and the House Ways and Means
Committee addressed by the proposed legislation.
11. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text for discussion of proposed
guidelines for use in formation of sale-leaseback transactions.
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through which the expanding use of this financial device could be
controlled. The fundamental issues of ownership, control, and ac-
countability will become manageable and straightforward through
the certainty of financial and tax consequences resulting from the use
of official guidelines.
II. Sale-Leasebacks Generally
A. Structure
The unification of such diverse elements of property transactions as
the sale, lease and option in the sale-leaseback transaction creates an
efficient vehicle for accomplishing various economic and business ob-
jectives. Frequently an owner of property is able to dispense with
ownership of the asset but is unwilling or unable to give up the use of
the property in its business. 12 The term "sale-leaseback" is a loosely-
defined term of art 13 used to describe various transactions involving
the transfer of property followed by its subsequent lease back to the
seller.14 Typically, sale-leaseback transactions of real property consist
12. See, e.g., Note, Sale-Leaseback v. Mere Financing: Lyon's Roar and the
Aftermath, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 1075 (to raise capital or relieve itself of debt, entity
may desire method by which to sell yet retain use of its property). But see DESCniIP-
TION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12-13 (since tax deductions can convert positive tax
on equity-financed structures into negative tax, they create "tax incentive for tax-
exempt entities to lease, rather than own, the buildings they use").
13. See, e.g., Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of
Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1948)
("sale and lease-back is being hawked and brokered as a panacea for corporate ills");
Morris, Sale-Leaseback Transactions of Real Property-A Proposal, 30 TAx LAW.
(A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n) 701 (1977) (sale-leaseback is "a catch-all phrase which de-
scribes many kinds of transactions carried out for various motives"); Note, Sale and
Leaseback Transactions-A General Review, 32 VAND. L. REV. 945, 947 (1979) (sale-
leasebacks "take a myriad of forms and transfer diverse types of property, such as
equipment, improved or unimproved real estate, and intangible property").
14. Note, supra note 13, at 945 n.10-13 (description of various leaseback vehicles,
including gift and leaseback, trust and leaseback, lease-leaseback, and particularly
the bootstrap sale and leaseback, which presents sale of property to tax-exempt
entity, thus allowing for "bailing out" of ordinary income from the property at
capital gains rates which has, however, been largely curtailed by I.R.C. § 512). See
also Vogt & Cole, Introduction and Types of Leases and Identifying Characteristics
of Tax-Exempt Leases, in A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL LEASINC 1-32 (A.J. Vogt & L. Cole
eds. 1983) (Municipal Finance Officers Association, Government Finance Research
Center) (municipalities may sign service agreements with investors or equipment
manufacturers to build such projects as waste-water treatment plants; investors
might qualify in these transactions for the investment tax credit (ITC)); New Design
at GM, FoRBEs, Feb. 1, 1982, at 38, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as New Design at GM]
(unusual loan transaction resembling sale-leaseback with option to purchase in credi-
tor). See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text for mortgage discussion.
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of a sale of land, land and improvements, or improvements alone to
an unrelated investor, and the simultaneous lease of the property back
to the seller.15 The purchaser' takes title by purchasing the property
at its full value, often financing its acquisition by borrowing funds
from an institutional lender or other investors secured by a mortgage
on the property and a conditional assignment of the lease. '7 The seller-
lessee commits itself to a long term lease of the property.18 Thus, the
basic documents involved in a sale-leaseback transaction are a sales
contract and a lease.
The purchaser will often seek to limit his financial obligation
toward the newly-acquired property to his initial contribution of
capital through the use of some form of net lease.' In the typical net
lease, the lessee (seller) pays a rental fee to the lessor (purchaser) while
also remaining responsible for paying operating expenses such as utili-
ties, maintaining the premises in good repair, paying real estate taxes,
and carrying adequate insurance coverage.20 Under this arrangement,
therefore, the lessor receives rent payments as income while avoiding
all expenses related to the management of the property.2' This ar-
rangement conveniently provides benefits to both parties, but can
15. M. LEVINE, REAL ESTATE FUNDAMENTALS 300 (1976).
16. To avoid any potential confusion posed by the unusual relationships of the
sale-leaseback transaction, this Note will use only the terms "purchaser" and "seller"
to describe the basic trading partners. Thus, "purchaser" will stand for "lessor" and,
in the transactions central to this article, for "taxpayer"; "seller" will stand for
"lessee" and "tax-exempt entity." Where necessary, full explanation of relationships
and additional or different terms will be provided.
17. See Vogt and Cole, Introduction, in A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL LEASING 1, 2-5
(A.J. Vogt and L. Cole eds. 1983) (Municipal Finance Officers Association, Govern-
ment Finance Research Center). These categories of transactions include "tax-exempt
or municipal leases," which are essentially conditional-sale leases or lease-purchase
agreements; "certificate of participation (COP) leases," a type of tax-exempt lease
which provides investors with fractional interests or shares, often represented by
small denomination certificates and marketed to the public; "finance leases," which
recoup the initial investment for the lessor bank or investor group plus provide a
satisfactory return on investment; and "leveraged leases," true leases with third-party
lenders or investors which yield the depreciation write-offs to the lessor and a return
to the investors. Id.
18. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text for discussion of renewal or
repurchase options.
19. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 273 (8th ed. 1983).
20. See, e.g., Vogt & Cole, supra note 17, at 4 (lessee is responsible for "execu-
tory" costs on leased property); Note, supra note 12, at 1077 n.7 (also called "net
lease" or "net net lease"); Weinstein & Silvers, The Sale and Leaseback Transaction
After Frank Lyon Company, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337, 339 (1978) (typical term
used to describe this type of lease is "triple net lease").
21. Id.
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prompt an investigation by the Internal Revenue Service as to true
ownership . 22
Options in the lease are often critical aspects of these transactions
since they serve to place the lessee in essentially the same position he
enjoyed as owner of the property.2 3 They may include options to
renew the leasehold for an extended term or to purchase the property
back from the investor at any time during the lease, at specified times,
or at the expiration of the lease term. These options also assure the
seller of continued use of property needed in his trade or business even
though he has relinquished title, and provide him a right to reacquire
the property should future business developments make this necessary
or desirable.2 4 The lease frequently allows the lessee to repurchase the
property at a price which declines over the property's expected useful
life; alternatively, the price may be left to determination by a future
appraisal.2 5 The lessee is sometimes given the right to terminate the
lease under specified conditions.2 6
B. Financial Incentives
The general reduction in federal funding to states and localities and
the continuing need to renovate and maintain existing facilities have
22. See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text for discussion of larger question
of "ownership" for tax purposes.
23. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for discussion of tax ramifications
where purchaser only retains a nominal residual value in the property through
granting of option.
24. Note, supra note 13, at 949. In the case of a tax-exempt entity, for example,
use of a sale-leaseback could provide a period in which to reorganize and generate
new sources of income, such as development of a new curriculum at a university
having sold its campus, or annexation of new property in the case of a municipality.
25. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for discussion of tax ramifications
where purchaser only retains a nominal residual interest in the property through
granting option. The test developed in case law is "compulsion to exercise" option: if
the seller is "compelled" to exercise the option (a "put"), then the lease transaction
will be labeled a financing arrangement and tax benefits will shift dramatically.
Frank Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. Comm'r,
562 F.2d 258, 269 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Frito-Lay, Inc.
v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (N.D, Ga. 1962). See also Harmelink and
Schurtz, Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate: A Proposal for Defined
Tax Rules, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 833, 840-41 (1982) (option price is important factor in
determining whether purchaser has taken an equity interest).
26. See Weinstein & Silver, supra note 20, at 339 (seller may have options to
renew lease for extended periods, including terms beyond useful life of property of
transaction or options to repurchase property at specified times; purchaser may have
termination rights under certain conditions, usually after substantial condemnation
or casualty).
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prompted tax-exempt entities such as municipalities to search for new
sources of funds. 27 The tax-exempt seller may be unable to raise funds
in traditional ways due to an unfavorable money market environ-
ment, an excess of debt or restrictions in corporate or municipal
charters. 28 Present economic conditions, 29 combined with the en-
27. See, e.g., Coughlan, Financing Alternatives Available to Local Govern-
ments, in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980s 147 (G. Lefcoe ed. 1983) (in face of
"severe cutbacks in federal funds," it has become "patently obvious" that state
governments are no longer financially able to extend substantial aid to local govern-
ments, thus forcing them into utilizing "creative financing alternatives"); Vogt, Why
Lease? in A GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL LEASING 33 (A.J. Vogt and L. Cole eds. 1983)
(Municipal Finance Officers Association, Government Finance Research Center).
The author states that the overriding reason to lease is a desire to spread the costs of
capital acquisitions over several fiscal periods or years, caused by (1) lack of revenue
for recurring capital replacements resulting from declining tax bases, taxpayer re-
volts, and inflation; (2) backlog of capital replacement needs due to political pressure
to maintain services in the face of slow-growing or declining revenues; (3) impracti-
cality of bond financing for purchases of short-lived but expensive equipment which
should be spread across several years; (4) major capital expenditures necessitated by a
one-time or non-recurring event such as municipal annexation; (5) need to conserve
operating reserves; (6) financial policy considerations such as limiting capital reserves
to major improvement projects or for investment purposes; or (7) seller insistence on
installment payments for income tax and cash flow purposes. Id. at 33-41.
28. Vogt & Cole, supra note 27, at 33-41.
29. DEsCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 357-388 (Title VII of proposed
legislation containing tax exempt bond provisions, including changes in mortgage
subsidy bonds and credit certificates, industrial development bonds, and tax-exempt
status of certain educational organizations, expected to turn projected revenue loss of
$54 million in 1984 to revenue gain by 1986 leading to $67 million gain in 1988). See
also Vogt & Duven, State Laws Governing Tax-Exempt Lease-Purchase Agreements,
State Usury Laws, in A GUIDE To MUNICIPAL LEASING 75 (A.J. Vogt and L. Cole eds.
1983) (Municipal Finance Officers Association, Government Finance Research Cen-
ter).
Long-term sale-leaseback transactions are substituted for revenue bond issues to
provide local governments with a means to avoid statutory limits on the interest rates
that may be charged for debt. Id. Voter approval is also thus avoided, which may
prove more efficient in terms of quickly obtaining cash or the use of the property.
Where voter antagonism to bond issues or poor credit ratings exists for a particular
local government, such transactions may be the only available means of generating
needed capital. Growth of Tax-Exempt Financing Stirs Battle on Revenues and
Rights, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, § 2, at 37, col. 4
[T]raditionally lower rates on municipal bonds are being washed away in
the flood of new bond issues. The huge supply of these bonds forces issuers
to entice investors with higher yields, thus increasing the cost of borrowing
for states and cities across the country-a cost ultimately borne by the
taxpayer. For example, for last year's record $78 billion of new long-term
municipal debt, rates offered by local and state governments were so high
that in some cases the difference between interest rates on taxable govern-
ment and tax-exempt securities virtually disappeared.
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hanced tax benefits available to property-owning taxpayers since
1981, have generated greater use of the sale-leaseback transaction as
an important source of funds.3 0
A wide variety of business, accounting and tax considerations pro-
vide incentives for using the sale-leaseback vehicle. The tax-exempt
seller of property utilizes the sale-leaseback transaction to generate
working capita13 1 or for investment funds. 32 While the seller has trans-
Id. See also Ways and Means Committee Plans Combination of Tax Bills Designed to
Close Loopholes, 233 WEEKLY BOND BUYER, Sept. 6, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (reporting on
proposed H.R. 4170, "a single 'loophole closing' tax bill," stating that combination of
bond restrictions, increased taxes on life insurance companies, and sharp limits on
sale-leasebacks by tax-exempt entities will "generate some of the $73 billion in
additional revenues the latest congressional budget plan calls for over the next three
years").
30. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. See also DESCRPTION OF S.
1564, supra note 1, at 2; DESCnIPTIoN oF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 2; DESCRIPTION
OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 62. The major attraction of sale-leaseback transactions
involving tax-exempt entities is that depreciation deductions may flow through in a
sale-leaseback in the form of reduced rents to tax-exempt entities otherwise ineligible
for these benefits. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 62. If arranged as a
service contract with a tax-exempt entity, the transaction may allow the parties to
avoid the nontaxable use restriction on the investment credit. Id. at 75-84; See Vogt
& Cole, supra note 17, at 1 (listing economic and legal factors leading to "the growth
and interest in leasing at the state and local government levels .... " including
spreading of cost of equipment and capital assets over multi-year periods, expensive
capital asset purchases with short useful lives, and federal tax laws and regulations
making leasing preferable to ownership); Pickle Introduces Bill to Restrict Sale-
Leasebacks By Tax-Exempt Entities, 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 11, 12 (June 6,
1983) (sale-leaseback transaction creates opportunity for cities, counties, states, and
federal agencies to sell tax writeoffs in the forms of accelerated depreciation, invest-
ment tax credits and interest deductions that they would never qualify for on their
own account; this will cause staggering revenue losses and add to federal deficit)
(citing Rep. Pickle (D. Tex.), sponsor of H.R. 3110).
31. Vogt & Cole, supra note 17, at 1 ("state and local governments have greatly
increased their reliance on leasing as a means to acquire the assets necessary to
provide public services"; "leasing has become a viable financing option for capital
assets as governments seek to continue to provide services and facilities while their
costs for doing so increase at a faster pace than revenues"); Tax-Leasing Twist, supra
note 9, at 57 (July 18, 1983) (Bennington College to generate $8.5 million in cash
while retaining use of its campus after lease-leaseback transaction to limited partner-
ship of alumni); Coughlan, Financing Alternatives Available to Local Governments,
in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980s, THE MESSAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS 147 (G. Lefcoe ed. 1983) (explores the creative financing alternatives local
governments are using in order to generate working capital since withdrawal of
federal and state aid); College Leasing Deals Are Target of Proposal to Clamp Down
on "Costly Tax Shelters," 26 CHRON. OF HIHER EDUC. 13 (June 29, 1983) (art school
significantly cut operating losses by use of sale-leaseback).
32. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1976); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-13, 14, 15 (1979). See Vogt &
Duven, Federal Laws Governing Tax-Exempt Lease-Purchase Agreements, in A
GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL LEASING 56 (A.J. Vogt & L. Cole eds. 1983). Federal arbitrage
regulations prohibit speculation by simultaneous purchases and sales in different
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formed his fixed asset into working capital, he has retained both
possession and use of the property. Additionally, the sale of the prop-
erty for its full value in a sale-leaseback transaction can yield more
cash than could be raised through borrowing against the property. 33
Perhaps the most important incentives behind sale-leaseback trans-
actions are the tax benefits associated with ownership of the prop-
erty. 34 These include depreciation or accelerated cost recovery (ACRS)
deductions 35 and investment tax credits (ITCs).36 ITCs may not be
claimed for property leased to and used by a governmental unit or by
a tax-exempt organization in its exempt function. 37 This "nontaxable
markets to capitalize on price differences. Id. For instance, the issuing of tax-exempt
bonds, such as industrial development bonds (IDBs) or other obligations, is prohib-
ited for the purpose of investment of the proceeds in higher yielding taxable secur-
ities, the interest on which is used to cover rental payments. Id.
33. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 13, at 7 (loan beyond certain percentage of
property's worth may be prevented by law or investor's internal policy); Smith &
Lubell, Real Estate Financing: Reflection on the Sale-Leaseback, 7 REAL EST. REV.
11 (Wint. 1978) (loan-to-value ratio generally limited in mortgage financing to
75%); Cary, Current Developments in Sale and Lease-Back Financing, 29 TEX. L.
REV. 54, 56-58 (1950) (safety features of sale-leaseback transactions provide 100%
financing to entities with reasonable credit); Schurtz, A Decision Model for Lease
Parties in Sale-Leasebacks of Real Estate, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 388-89
(1982) (a certain percentage may be regulated by state law); Note, Problems of
Judicial Interpretation of Real Estate Sale and Leaseback Taxation: Description,
Analysis, and Proposed Revision, 33 TAX LAW. 237, 246 n.48 (1979) (lender will
want to cushion risk with owner's equity).
34. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for discussion of eligibility of
tax-exempt entities for use of tax benefits in the form of lowered rent payments
passed through by taxpaying entities claiming tax deductions and credits.
35. I.R.C. § 168 (1976). For convenience of terms in this Note, "depreciation"
will stand for both depreciation deductions and for the accelerated cost recovery
system (ACRS). ACRS applies to recovery property which is tangible property (1) of
a depreciable character, (2) placed in service after 1980, and (3) used in a trade or
business or held for the production of income. See DEPRECIATION GUIDE, supra note 4,
at 100-170 (ACRS was made mandatory for most depreciable-type tangible prop-
erty placed in service after 1980 due to intent to create new incentives to stimulate
capital investment in face of diminished value of previous depreciation allowances
due to inflation and urgent need to upgrade technology); TAX HANDBOOK, supra note
4, at 2004 ("recovery of cost of depreciable property placed in service after 1980
will generally be determined under the ACRS by using statutory accelerated meth-
ods, applied over a prescribed statutory period").
36. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text for discussion of governmental
use property and eligibility for a claim of ITC.
37. I.R.C. § 48(a)(4)-(5) (1976). The 10% investment credit regularly claimed
applies to depreciable tangible personal property which is either ACRS recovery
property (I.R.C. § 168) or other depreciable property with a useful life of at least 3
years (I.R.C. § 48(a)(1)). See DEscmrIToN OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 67-72
(definitions and explanation of provisions affecting tax-exempt use property).
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use restriction" does not, however, otherwise restrict an eligible pur-
chaser from claiming depreciation deductions or other tax benefits.
38
Rent payments constitute ordinary income to the purchaser. 3 As
owner of the property, the purchaser may depreciate the real property
improvements over their useful lives in order to offset this income.
40
Since depreciation is not a current out-of-pocket expense to the pur-
chaser, 4' he may have cash in hand in spite of aggregate deductions
exceeding the amount of the rental income, especially during the early
years of the lease when the depreciation deductions are greatest. 42 In
this way "tax-sheltered cash flow" is generated. 43
This net cash flow to the investors in the property during the initial
lease term and any renewals, as well as any sale or financing proceeds,
38. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 67-72. For purposes of eligibility
for claiming these deductions, present rules used for determination of whether per-
sonal property is tax-exempt use property apply except to the extent modified by the
provisions of H.R. 4170 dealing with service contracts or similar arrangements. If
owned by, leased to, or otherwise used by a tax-exempt entity, property other than
15-year real property will be tax-exempt use property. Therefore, it remains possible
that a tax-exempt entity could be treated as the property owner under a purported
lease, service contract, or other arrangement. Id.
39. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (1976).
40. I.R.C. § 62(5) (1976). See Burke, Why Some Sale and Leaseback Arrange-
ments Succeed While Others Fail, 26 J. TAX'N 130 (March 1967) (when used together
with analysis of option price, as where seller's rental payments are applied toward
option price as part of deal, rate of rental payments may trigger recharacterization
by IRS as a financial device and eliminate tax aspects of transaction); TAx HAND-
BOOK, supra note 4, at 2410 (these are deductions from adjusted gross income,
including, from accounting point of view, only such deductions regarded as being
directly incurred from rental of property); Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at
838-39 (unreasonably high or low rental payments may serve as gauge for use by IRS
and courts in determining whether equity interest has in fact passed and valid lease
arrangement has been made).
41. See Seidler & Carmichael, supra note 4, at 22-23 (depreciation is "a process
of allocation, not of valuation," aiming to apportion cost or other fundamental value
of tangible capital assets, less any salvage value, "over the estimated useful life of the
unit ...in a systematic and rational manner," thus reflecting its assigned value in
operating statement).
42. 1983 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 300 ("noncash charges added to other
deductions exceed gross income ... resulting in cash available for distribution to
investors that may not be currently taxed or is taxed at a lower rate"; in the case of
tax-exempts, of course, this cash is not taxed at all). See supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text for discussion of cash flow and tax-exempt entities.
43. See How Leasebacks Beat the High Cost of Money, Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1981,
at 26, col. 2 (investors near federal tax ceiling are better able to take advantage of
property depreciation than corporations at maximum federal tax rate of 46%); New
Design at GM, supra note 14 (GM put premium on cash flow in five year, $40 billion
modernization, thus necessitating unusual $500 million lease transaction of its Man-
hattan office tower).
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usually provides a higher rate of return than a loan secured by the
property. 44 Rental payments are usually set at the fair rental value of
the property, but they may be set at a rate designed to amortize the
purchaser's investment over the primary term of the lease at a speci-
fied rate of return. 45
The purchaser's deductions for depreciation are based on the prop-
erty's cost to him, rather than its current market value46 which may
have increased or decreased during the seller's years of ownership.
The purchaser must have made an actual capital investment 47 in the
property for the investment to be included in the property's basis
when computing depreciation. 48 No amount of basis attributable to
land is depreciable. 49
44. Cary, supra note 13, at 9-11. This higher rate of return to purchaser results
from the fact that risk is higher since purchaser investing 100% of property's fair
market value rather than lower percentage generally risked on a loan. Purchaser's
margin will of course reflect market price fluctuations caused by economic conditions
such as inflation versus a stable economy. Id.
45. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. Rent payments unrealistically
below fair rental value may be a crucial factor in recharacterization by IRS of a sale-
leaseback transaction as a mortgage. Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at 838-39,
46. I.R.C. § 167(g) (Basis for Depreciation); id. § 1011 (Adjusted Basis for
Determining Gain or Loss); id. § 1012 (Basis of Property-Cost) (1976); see also
DEPRECIATION GUIDE, supra note 4, at 201-206 (three items essential for computing
depreciation are (1) basis of asset for depreciation purposes, (2) estimated salvage
value at end of useful life of asset, and (3) estimated useful life of asset); Fuller, Sales
and Leasebacks and the Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 60, 62 (1979)
(depreciation deductions are limited by three factors: (1) historical basis used for its
calculation is generally less than market value, (2) original basis is reduced over the
years lowering the value of deductions, and (3) no amount of basis allocable to land is
subject to depreciation); Schurtz, supra note 33, at 391-92 (rental income is only
taxable if it is "related" business income to a purchasing tax-exempt entity). Depreci-
ation amount is found by subtracting salvage value from basis; period over which
asset is depreciated is useful life. DEPRECIATION GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1 201-206.
47. Cf. Vogt & Cole, supra note 17, at 4 (leveraged leases involve lenders as third
parties with actual substantial financial stake, often as much as 50-80% of capital
needed to buy leased property).
48. Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939), afJ'g, 101 F.2d 728 (6th
Cir.), af'g, 32 B.T.A. 633 (1935) (test of who bears burden of exhaustion of capital
investment is based on whether legal title passes, how parties treat transaction,
whether equity was acquired in the property, whether parties are in fact obligated to
each other as seller and buyer, who pays taxes on property, and who bears risk of loss
or damage); Frank Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1977), rev'g, 536 F.2d 746
(8th Cir. 1976) (four elements in test to determine economic reality to transaction: (1)
whether transaction is genuinely multiple party, (2) with economic substance, (3)
compelled by business realities, and (4) imbued with tax-independent considerations
not shaped solely by tax avoidance); Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305, 360-61 (1980),
aff'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 211 (1983) (distin-
guished Lyon and adopted an "imprudent abandonment" test focusing on value of
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The evaluation of the economic substance of the transaction is
necessary to determine whether property is "used by" a tax-exempt
entity50 and thus ineligible for the ITC. Subject to several exceptions, 51
a nontaxable use restriction will exist on property leased to any tax-
exempt entity, in which case the ITC may not be claimed by the
purchaser. 52 The ITC was created in 1962 to stimulate expansion of
productive facilities by reducing the net costs of acquiring new equip-
ment.5 3 Since governmental demand for property was viewed as being
independent of its price, no corresponding increase in production was
believed to have been derived from extending the ITC to governmen-
cash flow derived from rental payments and giving little weight to speculative
possibility that the property would have a substantial residual value at end of
leaseterm; court cocluded that purchaser would not "at any time find it imprudent
from an economic point of view to abandon the property," and thus there was no
justification for transaction apart from its tax consequences). See 1983 STAND. FED.
'TAx REP'. (CCH) 1715.23 (IRS uses "economic reality test" based on capital invest-
ment requirement for claiming depreciation deductions in determining whether tax
shelter activities are formed merely for tax avoidance purposes; a true obligation
must be represented by nonrecourse indebtedness in property for it to be included in
basis of such property for determining amount of depreciation).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1960) ("depreciation allowance for tangible prop-
erty applies only to that part of property subject to wear and tear, to decay or decline
from natural causes, to exhaustion, and to obsolescence"; "allowance does not apply
to inventories or stock in trade, or to land apart from improvements or physical
development added to it"). See DEPRECIATION GuIDE, supra note 4, 329 ("the excess
of expenditures for repair, maintenance, rehabilitation and improvement of repair
allowance property . . . over the repair allowance is called a 'property improve-
ment' "); Comment, Loss Recognition Upon Sale and Leaseback: the Like Kind
Exchange Controversy, 28 Lov. L. REV. 1146, 1148 n.14 (1982) ("to be depreciated
. . . improvements must either be used in the taxpayer's trade or business or held for
the production of income").
50. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for discussion of requirements
for eligibility for ITC claim.
51. See DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 7-10; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 7-10; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 13-15; DESCrPTION OF H.R.
4170, supra note 1, at 58-61 (statutory exceptions to nontaxable use restriction
include property used by tax-exempt organization in taxable unrelated trade or
business; certain international organizations; foreign governments and possessions of
U.S.; foreign persons, unless property used predominantly outside U.S.; and rehabili-
tation tax credits for qualified rehabilitation expenditures); DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
4170, supra Vote 1, at 58-61. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.48-1(j) and (k) (1972) ("casual
or short-term lease" exception); Rev. Rul. 68-109, 1968-1 C.B. 10 ("service contract"
exception).
52. See DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 6-10; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 6-10; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 13-15; DESCRrTION OF H.R.
4170, supra note 1, at 57-61.
53. See DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 7; DESCRPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 7; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 13; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 62-63.
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tal units.5 4 Under the legislation pending in 1984, availability of the
ITC to tax-exempt entities would be further eliminated.5 5
C. Advantages v. Disadvantages
While the seller may obtain more cash through a sale-leaseback
transaction than through a mortgage or bond issuance, 56 this advan-
tage must be weighed against a generally higher rate of interest im-
plied in the rental payments, and the greater costs and complexities
involved in structuring these transactions. 57 The higher costs of this
method of financing are less significant where ordinary debt or debt
secured by an encumbrance against the property is unavailable or
available only on unattractive terms.5 8
A sale-leaseback transaction provides superior security to the pur-
chaser in the form of simple default remedies. Since the purchaser-
lessor has title to the property and a valid lease exists, landlord and
tenant law applies to the leasehold relationship. 59 If the seller defaults
by failing to make rental payments, the purchaser can usually evict
54. TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 13. For discussion of the policy related to
economic issue of neutrality addressed by Joint Committee, see infra at note 99 and
accompanying text.
55. DEscmrIoN OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 18; DEscRIrioN OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 17-18; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 74-75.
56. Cary, supra note 13, at 6-8.
57. See TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 22. The Joint Committee questions
whether the amount of the benefits given tax-exempt entities at the cost of loss of
revenue to the U.S. Treasury is not "dissipated in the form of private profits and legal
and administrative expenses?" Id. The Committee believes that these benefits pass to
the attorneys, bankers, leasing companies, and other investors or agents involved in
these transactions. Id. at 22-23. See also Cary, supra note 13, at 9-11 (higher charges
of sale-leaseback transactions due largely to (1) greater risk to investor since, in spite
of having simple default remedies, there is no general obligation from seller, (2)
lower liquidity and marketability of investment, and (3) transaction costs greater
than with other investments).
58. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text for discussion of general eco-
nomic climate and particular restrictions on borrowing.
59. See, e.g., R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 15. 10(a) (8th ed.
1983) (quick possessory remedy of forcible entry and detainer available in sale-
leaseback); S. MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES: PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG
TERM 105-42, 309-22 (6th ed. 1974) (chapter on sale-leaseback transactions; sample
lease); Cf. REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK 1040-41 (M. Seldin ed. 1980) (for safety in
investment, purchaser should "determine what the market value of the property
would be if it were vacant and should investigate the financial strength of the
tenant") (emphasis in original); Strum, Sale-Leasebacks: Protection for Accelerated
Depreciation Deduction and Clear Title, reprinted in 7 A.B.A. REAL PROP., PROBATE
AND TRUST J. 785, 785-97 (1974) (protection of passage of title between owner and
tenant-developer as to improvements, with sample lease).
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through a summary process. After a simple eviction process, pur-
chaser-lessor has the right to immediately lease the property to a new
lessee.60 In contrast, a mortgagee must use the lengthy and expensive
foreclosure process to take possession where a mortgagor defaults on
payments of principal or interest."'
The purchaser's risk is higher than that of the mortgagee because
the purchaser is investing the entire fair market value of the property
rather than the lower percentage usually securing a loan.62 This risk is
partially offset by the more advantageous default remedies available
to a purchaser, 6 although the problem of re-renting or selling the
property should the seller default remains. 4
Any rise in the value of the property is an advantage to the pur-
chaser who retains a reversionary interest in the leased property and
any of the lessee's remaining improvements upon expiration of the
lease.6 5 The purchaser may realize the property's appreciated value by
selling or renting at a higher rate upon termination of the original
60. Rosenberg & Cohn, Sale-Leaseback Transactions, in EVALUATING TAX SHEL-
TER OFFERINGS 831, 835 (P.L.I. 1981). But see TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 24. If the
property is unique and useable only by the current lessee, purchaser could not easily
re-rent (e.g., a college campus or a municipality's city hall). Id. This factor will
naturally decrease the attractiveness of the transaction and therefore will directly
influence its financial usefulness, Id.
61. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 15.10(a) (8th ed. 1983); S.
MCMICHAEL & P. O'KEEFE, LEASES: PERCENTAGE, SHORT AND LONG TERM 111-12 (6th
ed. 1974) (sample lease at 309-22).
62. See, e.g., DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 13; DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
3110, supra note 1, at 12-13; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 22-23 (this risk may be
outweighed by tax benefits gained by these investors; some benefits to tax-exempt
entities may be siphoned off by transaction costs); Sale-Leasebacks Intrigue the
Nation's Municipalities, But Complex Tax Consequences Are Leading to A Cautious
Approach, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1983, § 8 (Real Est.), at 7, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Nation's Municipalities] ("[m]ost deals offer more tax shelter than cash flow benefits
to private investors," indicating the limited appeal of these transactions; "[t]here are
investments out there of greater quality and security") (quoting Jack Freeman,
consultant to New York City on sale-leaseback transactions). See supra note 30 and
accompanying text for discussion of limitations on mortgage borrowing.
63. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text for discussion of default reme-
dies available to lessor.
64. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text for discussion of value of rever-
sionary interests in leased property and improvements.
65. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 46, at 48 (trend in United States has been for fair
market value of real estate to rise); TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 7 (U.S. Navy
required to pay termination value to contractor if specially designed naval vessels
prove unsaleable at end of lease term; shipowner, a third party to transaction, retains
any excess of proceeds over termination value); Weinstein & Silver, supra note 20, at
337 n.1 (equipment more likely to incur actual decline in value from wear-and-tear
or economic obsolescence, thus necessitating shorter-term leases than those of real
estate).
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lease.66 If the seller has obtained a repurchase option exercisable at
termination of the leasehold, the purchaser may still realize the prop-
erty's increased value if the purchase price of the option is determined
as a function of the market value at the expiration of the lease term.,,
The purchaser, however, assumes the risk of the property depreciating
over time due to changes in market conditions or the neighborhood, or
from the bankruptcy of a tenant of an unusual property.68 These
conditions could make finding a new tenant or selling the property
difficult or uneconomical. 9
D. Accounting Issues
For many years, sale-leaseback transactions were regarded for ac-
counting purposes as operating leases, rather than capital leases. Con-
sequently, they did not appear on the sellers' balance sheets as liabili-
ties. 0 The transformation of the fixed property asset into the current
cash asset was coupled with the simultaneous elimination of any
liability that had been attached to the property. The seller thus en-
hanced his credit standing by increasing his current ratio of assets to
liabilities.7 1
66. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for discussion of critical tax ramifi-
cations of residual value. See also Note, supra note 12, at 1096-98 (renewal and
repurchase options can extend probable date of purchaser realizing residual value so
far into future as to make any computation of amount impossible).
67. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text for tax ramifications of options.
In general, the fixed price purchase option is precluded in sale-leaseback transactions
since the IRS requires the option to be exercised at fair market value as determined at
time of exercise. DESCIUPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 17; DEscmPTiON OF S.
1564, supra note 1, at 19; DEScRIrION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 69. Further, a
purchaser may not retain a contractual right to require a seller to purchase property
(a put). Id.
68. See New Design at GM, supra note 14 ($500 million financing transaction
with creditor essentially paying for option to purchase at end of 5-year lease term;
risk in this unusual transaction is shared by debtor, GM, in its spread between
present value received, approximately $385 million, and apparent value given of
$500 million).
69. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text for discussion of ability to re-
rent property.
70. Cary, supra note 13, at 11-12.
71. Schurtz, supra note 33, at 389. From a business perspective, this gauge of an
entity's liquidity (i.e., capacity to generate immediate cash) displays to the financial
community the entity's general solvency, a basic indicator of credit-worthiness. By
eliminating balance sheet reporting, the operating lease status replaces fixed assets
with current assets and may remove a liability the seller carried prior to sale, thus
increasing current ratio which may in turn increase the seller's credit standing and
borrowing capacity. See infra note 72 and accompanying text for discussion of
operating lease versus capital lease.
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Since November 1976 a lease has had to meet the strict standards of
the complex Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 13
(FASB 13) to qualify for treatment as an operating lease.7 2 If the lease
falls within the criteria of FASB 13, it is viewed as having essentially
transferred certain attributes of ownership to the purchaser, who
carries it on his books as a capital lease. 73 The seller, on the other
hand, has transferred the asset as a financing device under the ac-
counting standard and thus carries the lease as a "direct financing" or
"sales-type" lease, which essentially means he is not treated as an
owner. 
7 4
The use of a leasing device, as opposed to a purchase of property,
may shift the disbursement of funds from a Federal agency's procure-
ment account to a less closely observed part of the budget such as an
operations and maintenance account.7 5 Where a Federal agency
might otherwise show an authorization or annual outlay as a single
entry in the procurement section of its budget, in a leasing transaction
the cost of the property will appear only in the form of annual rental
72. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS No. 13, Accounting for Leases, (FASB 13), Stamford, Conn.,
Nov. 1976. FASB 13 requires that leases be capitalized and accounted for as assets
and liabilities ("capital" leases) if they meet any one of the following four criteria:
1. ownership is transferred to the lessee by the end of the lease;
2. the lease contains a bargain (i.e., less than fair value) purchase option;
3. the lease term equals 75% or more of the estimated life of the leased property;
4. the present value of the minimum lease payments is 90% or more of the fair value
of the leased property minus the lessor's retained investment credit.
A lease meeting none of these criteria may be classified as "operating" and need not
be shown on the balance sheet; rentals may be charged to operations as they become
payable. Id.
FASB 13 applies to all entities whose financial statements are prepared in confor-
mity with generally accepted accounting principles, and applies equally for both the
seller and purchaser in most sale-leaseback transactions. Vogt & Cole, Types of
Leases and Identifying Characteristics of Tax-Exempt Leases, in A GUIDE TO MUNICI-
PAL LEASING 16-18 (A.J. Vogt & L. Cole eds. 1983) (Municipal Finance Officers
Association, Government Finance Research Center). National Council on Govern-
mental Accounting's Statement 5, effective for fiscal years beginning after June 30,
1983, incorporates the FASB 13 lease classification scheme, financial principles, and
accounting. Id.
73. FASB 13, supra note 72.
74. See Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at 870-78 (discussion of accounting
treatment for sale-leaseback transactions under FASB 13, including "direct financing
leases"-those other than leveraged leases, which do not give rise to manufacturer's
or dealer's profit-and "sales-type leases," which do give rise to manufacturer's or
dealer's profit).
75. See DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 13.
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payments."' This perceived distortion of outlays, which may in fact
reflect more accurately the annual expenses of the tax-exempt entity,
is believed by the Joint Committee on Taxation and House Ways and
Means Committee ("Committees") to obscure "the multi-year finan-
cial commitment of the lessee [seller]." 77
E. IRS Recharacterization Powers
The form that the parties to a sale-leaseback transaction use to
characterize the transaction for federal income tax purposes will not
always withstand analysis of its substance. The primary aspect of a
designated "sale" that must withstand analysis is whether the pur-
chaser, who desires to claim deductions as the owner of the property,
has accumulated a satisfactory number of the economic incidents of
ownership possessed by an ordinary purchaser in a bona fide sale.78
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenges transactions which it
believes consist of mere schemes for the purchase of tax benefits, a
situation perceived by the IRS as more likely where one party is a tax-
exempt entity. 79 A tax audit leading the IRS to recharacterize the sale
76. DESCmPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 65. Leasing's tax benefits are
open-ended and therefore unmanageable as to composition and amount; appropria-
tions are contained in size and can be linked to current yearly priorities. Id. Tax
benefits also appear as reduced tax collections in the federal budget, unrelated to any
distinct public purpose. Therefore, where tax benefits serve to convey federal aid,
discovery is complicated as to what tax-exempt purposes have been federally assisted,
the amount of assistance, and whether this assistance has been rendered consistently
with other public policy objectives. Id. Such issues are generally observed, argued,
and resolved in the appropriations process. Id.
77. See TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 22. Accounting techniques used for leasing
by many nonprofit entities are different than those used for ordinary purchases,
resulting in the concealment of the character of outlays and a reduction in account-
ability. Id. The Joint Committee notes that this problem is not limited to nonprofit
entities. Id. (leasing "constitutes a significant source of off-balance sheet financing in
the corporate sector"). Cf. infra note 114 and accompanying text.
78. Frank Lyon v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581-84 (1977), rev'g, 536 F.2d
746 (8th Cir. 1976) ("so long as the lessor [purchaser] retains significant and genuine
attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the
parties governs for tax purposes"). See DESCrPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 56
(inherently factual determination of federal income tax ownership of property re-
quires particularized factual inquiry, based on standards which have evolved in court
cases, revenue rulings and revenue procedures); Weinstein & Silver, supra note 20, at
353 ("Court merely listed a torrent of factors instead of establishing a set of guidelines
to be used by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts in future cases"); see supra
note 48 and accompanying text for discussion of ownership tests.
79. Bond, Tax Benefit Transactions and the Public Sector, 15 URBAN LAW. 401,
423 (1983) (this likelihood may cause purchaser of property to insist on an indemnifi-
cation from governmental unit for loss of tax benefits should transaction be recharac-
terized by IRS).
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can cause the purchaser to forfeit his depreciation, interest, and "nec-
essary and ordinary business expense" deductions.80
The determination of whether a designated "lease" is truly a lease
under present law requires a factual analysis of the transaction in light
of principles enunciated in court cases, revenue rulings, and revenue
procedures issued by the IRS. The courts and the IRS first look for
economic indicia of ownership, such as whether the lessee holds title
to or has an equity interest in the property. 8' The seller (user) of the
property may also jeopardize lease treatment by retaining an option to
regain title at the end of the lease term for a nominal price, or for a
price which is relatively small when compared with the total payment
stream. 8
Absent sufficient indicia, further criteria focusing on the economic
substance of the transaction rather than its form are applied. 83 If tax
considerations are determined to be a significant motive for the trans-
action, a court may disregard the form of the transaction and treat it
as a secured financing device such as a mortgage.8 4 If, however, there
80. Note, supra note 12, at 1083. The purchaser's loss of these deductions is
cushioned by a decrease in income resulting from rental income being recharacter-
ized as debt payments. Id. Were seller a taxpayer, a major repercussion would be a
100% loss of rent payment deductions as a business expense since payments would
then be regarded as loan payments, restricting deductions to interest portion only.
id.
81. See DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 5-6; DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564,
supra note 1, at 5-6; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 9-13; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 56-57.
82. See M & W Gear Co. v. Comm'r, 446 F.2d 841, 845-46 (7th Cir. 1971); Rev.
Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39 and cases cited therein.
The purchaser will be regarded as having transferred total ownership in the
property for the stream of rental payments where the property's residual value is
nominal. DESClrIoN OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 5. If the purchase option remains
small compared with fair market value, full ownership will be seen as transferred
clue to the probability of repurchase at the end of the lease term. Id. If a "put" exists
in the lease (if the purchaser can force the original seller to repurchase the property),
then the transaction might not qualify as a lease since there would be no risk to the
purchaser at the end of the lease term. DESCRIPTION OF H.R.3110, supra note 1, at 5
See also Fuller, supra note 46, at 66-67 (seller may be regarded by IRS as holding
equity in property with result of loss of rent deduction if attractive option to repur-
chase exists which will likely compel repurchase); Nation's Municipalities, supra note
62 (since "most" sale-leaseback transactions to municipalities carry option provisions,
there is danger of future financial difficulties in the period when they must reacquire
the property for an unpredictable amount).
83. Id. See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939), aif'g, 101 F.2d 728
(6th Cir.), afj'g, 32 B.T.A. 633 (1935). "In the field of taxation, administrators of the
laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written
documents are not rigidly binding." 308 U.S. at 255.
84. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for discussion of similarities of
sale-leasebacks to mortgages; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text for
discussion of rules formulated by courts for determining ownership.
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is also a bona fide business purpose and the purchaser retains suffi-
cient burdens and benefits of ownership, the form of the transaction
will control . 5 This requires a showing of reasonable expectation of
profit from the transaction independent of the anticipated tax bene-
fits.8
A sale-leaseback transaction may be substantively, although not
formally identical to a long-term mortgage on the owner's property
where title is transferred to the lender to secure the obligation.8 7 This
type of transaction has been the subject of a series of major IRS
challenges of sale-leasebacks for forty years. 88 Similarly, the sale-
85. See DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 5-6; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 5-6; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 9-12; (purchaser-lessor must be
party suffering or gaining from value fluctuations); TAX HANDBOOK supra note 4, at
2002 (tax owner is entity sustaining financial disadvantage from property value
decrease resulting from depreciation, usually being entity with capital invested in
property).
86. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. This element of test is clearly
not determinative since mortgagee would also make a profit from a mere financing
arrangement, as well as from a bona fide sale-leaseback.
87. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978), rev'g, 536
F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976) (Court established general test of economic substance to
avoid characterization as mortgage); Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), aff'd
per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 211 (1982) (first detailed
examination of the purchaser's interest after Lyon). See Bond, supra note 79, at 423-
26 (noting that Tax Court, since the Supreme Court's decision in Lyon, seems to have
recognized financing requirements as valid business purpose for transactions, sub-
stantiating any tax motivations); Note, supra note 13, at 968-79 (1979) (analysis of
American Realty, Sun Oil, and Lyon); Fuller, supra note 46, at 63-64 (IRS bases its
attack on substance rather than form for determining tax consequences). See also
Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66; Comment, Hilton v. Commissioner: Sale-Lease-
back Analysis Sharpened, 1 VA. TAX REV. 375, 376 (1982), reprinted in, Digest of
Tax Articles 52, 52-53 (1983) (no matter how much agreement in mortgage form
resembles an actual sale, owner-mortgagor may only deduct interest portion of loan
payments (I.R.C. § 163), while creditor-lender recognizes equivalent sum of interest
income (I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (1976); in contrast, seller in sale-leaseback transaction may
deduct 100 % of rental payments for a business, while purchaser, taking cost basis of
property, entitled to depreciation deductions).
See Weinstein & Silver, supra note 20, at 340-42. As a corollary to the net lease
characteristic of a sale-leaseback transaction, the borrower, as equitable owner of
property, continues to meet operating expenses and performs various maintenance
activities associated with the property. Id. Often, these obligations will be found in
loan documentation of mortgage, which may in fact be a lease in order to effect
transfer of legal title to the lender. Id. Further, payments to the lender may be
termed "rent" and the agreement may require monthly or quarterly payments of
debt service. Id. Finally, title to the property will revert to the borrower at the end of
the debt payments, when the mortgage is satisfied. Id.
88. See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) (early, landmark
Supreme Court decision regarding tax consequences of sale-leaseback transaction
which IRS attempted to recharacterize as a mortgage); Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.
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leaseback also closely resembles the conditional-sale lease, in which
the lessee, for federal income tax purposes, remains the owner of the
property throughout the lease term. 89
Sale-leaseback transactions have remained difficult and expensive
due largely to the lack of substantive guidance from the IRS and the
courts regarding the proper structure to be utilized in their forma-
tion.9 ° As a result of litigation brought under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, IRS Audit Guidelines became available to the public in
1975.1' Although the Guidelines provide criteria for determining
305 (1980), afJ'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 211
(1982) (recent decision stating factors for determining ownership for tax purposes).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text for discussion of series of cases and rules
formulated for determining ownership for tax purposes. For examples of approaches
to the mortgage characterization problem see, e.g., 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIF-rs, 4.4.6, 4-75 (1981) ("courts have vacillated between
allowing taxpayers to invoke substance-over-form, business purpose, and step trans-
action doctrines" on equal basis with IRS and "letting them stew in their own juice if
that appeals to the government's appetite," when taxpayers attempt to restructure a
transaction); Bond, supra note 79, at 419-26 (where no partnership agreement is
determined by a court to have been intended, all facts and circumstances relating to
beneficial ownership of property must be analyzed, including all contractual rela-
tionships between the entities); Rosenberg, Weinstein, Sale-Leaseback Transactions
After Frank Lyon Company, in EVALUATING TAX SHELTE OFFFRINGs 843 (Rosenberg
& Cohn eds. P.L.I. 1981) (discussion of economic substance test which emerged after
Lyon); Schurtz, supra note 33 (article presents decision model to assist tax planners in
determining structure of valid sale-leaseback of real estate); Note, supra note 13, at
968-81 (Lazarus Court cited intentions of parties as important factor in determining
ownership, and held that while transaction was structured as transfer and leaseback,
IRS should respect parties' intentions to create mortgage).
89. Vogt & Cole, supra note 72, at 11-32 (full survey of various types of leasing
arrangements affecting tax-exempts, including conditional-sales leases in which lessee
pays for asset in installments over time with payments which include both principal
portion and interest or financing portion).
90. Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at 835-36 (discusses various methods for
determining usefulness of sale-leaseback of real estate as tax device, criticizing exist-
ing congressional, accounting, IRS, and judicial approaches for failure to comport
with the four essential issues for achieving sensible tax treatment: specificity, feasibil-
ity, equity, and economic reality); Note, supra note 12, at 1103 (Lyon, subsequent
case law, and IRS remain unclear as to necessary qualities of economic substance
demanded of sale-leaseback transactions, causing uncertainty as to whether a court
will recharacterize sale-leaseback as financing arrangement); Schurtz, supra note 33,
at 386 ("no single test or combination of tests seems to be absolutely determinative").
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1978 & Supp. IV 1980); Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715
and a companion document Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752 (if guideline require-
ments are fulfilled and circumstances direct, IRS will issue advance letter character-
izing deal as lease and that lessor is owner for federal income tax purposes); see
DEscznrTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 6; DESCRWrION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1,
at 6. Specific requirements to be met to receive advance letter indicating lease status
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whether a given transaction is a valid leasing structure or merely a
financing arrangement, they do not specify the number of criteria that
must apply before a lease will be recognized as valid for tax pur-
poses. 92 These criteria are still applied by the IRS and the courts in
cases involving sale-leaseback transactions of both equipment and real
estate. 93 Nevertheless, sale-leaseback transactions are used by tax-
exempt entities because of the attractive depreciation allowances
available to private investors under current tax law.9 4 Congress per-
ceives these allowances as an indirect, and therefore uncontrollable
federal subsidy. 95
include (1) minimum 20% unconditional investment by purchaser at-risk in prop-
erty; (2) purchase options exercisable only at fair market value at time of exercise; (3)
neither lessee nor a related party may (a) furnish any of the investment cost nor (b)
loan the investment funds to the lessor; (4) lessor must expect to receive a profit from
the transaction, with a positive cash flow independent of tax benefits; and (5)
property unique in use to lessee is ineligible for lease treatment. Id.
See also Vogt & Cole, supra, note 72, at 11-16 (IRS criteria for distinguishing
between true and conditional sales leases); Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at
865-70 (test designed for use with IRS audit guidelines).
92. Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at 865-70.
93. See, e.g., Sun Oil v. Comm'r, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 944 (1978) (listed series of factors without ascribing particular weight to any in
finding a valid sale-leaseback); Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th
Cir. 1976), aff'g, 64 T.C. 752 (1975) (where seller continued to be responsible for
first and second mortgages, with right to place additional mortgages, sale-leaseback
held invalid); American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974)
(adapted traditional intent test to multiple factor analysis, such as a repurchase
option and fairness of purchase price); Miller v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 767 (1977) (grossly
undercapitalized purchaser constructed a building with mortgage financing and
leased it to college which was to repay mortgage; college held to be owner); Frito-
Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962) (seller entitled to
repurchase for original price of the land, but would forfeit new buildings if option
not exercised within twenty years). See also DESCRPmTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at
6; DEscuPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 6 ("guidelines are not by their terms a
definitive statement of legal principles and are not intended for audit purposes");
Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25, at 866 (IRS audit guidelines seem to refer
basically to equipment leases, but they also cite several real estate sale-leaseback
cases, including Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978)).
94. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text for discussion of tax benefits
associated with sale-leasebacks under current law.
95. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 65.
[T]he Committee believes that Federal aid to tax-exempt entities (above
and beyond their tax exemption) should be made by appropriations rather
than by tax benefits transfered through tax system. The tax benefits in
leasing are open-ended and hence uncontrollable in amount and composi-
tion, whereas appropriations are limited and adjustable to current priori-
ties from year to year.
Id. at 65. Accord DESCfrPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12; DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
3110, supra note 1, at 12; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 23.
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In response to a perceived flood of non-traditional leasing arrange-
ments involving new types of properties and different partners,"" bills
designed to curtail perceived abuses of tax-exempt status and certain
provisions of the tax code 7 were introduced in the House Ways and
96. See, e.g., Leasing City Hall: That's the Latest Twist in Municipal Financing,
63 Barron's, May 16, 1983, at 39, col. 1 ("[c]ity managers would almost be guilty of
malfeasance" if they failed to utilize leasing since they can shift 30 % of lease cost to
federal government; "Why the hell not? It's perfectly legal") (quoting Reginald
Todd, Rep. Pickle's [bill's sponsor] chief aide); How Cities Are Selling Tax Write-
Offs, Bus. WK., April 5, 1982, at 95, col. 1 ("[u]nder severe budget pressures, many
municipalities are exploring ways to cut costs or raise cash by selling the long-
neglected tax benefits inherent in their construction projects"); Harris, Wanna Buy
the Brooklyn Bridge? 129 FORBES, March 15, 1982, at 59, col. 1 (impoverished
American cities seeking new sources of revenue to provide basic services expect more
financial problems caused by federal withdrawal of funding, affecting such infra-
structure operations as road repair and building maintenance; President Reagan's
"new federalism" proposals cited as further cause of stress on municipal budgets);
Focus on Leasing, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1983, at D2, col. 3 (Rep. Pickle gathered
evidence that "there may be a trend" toward leasing by tax-exempts); Bannon,
Selling City Hall, 266 HARP'E'S, June 1983, at 18, col. 2 (historic preservation tax
incentives estimated to result in revenue loss to government of $40 milllion between
1976-1981); Many Universities Moving Into Real Estate Business As Need for Campus
Expansion Eases, 26 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., at 8, col. 1 (reduced enrollment has
heightened income requirements to maintain instruction and research quality; fiscal
support not only benefit since such partnerships close "the gap ... between intellec-
tual and economic enterprise"); Moore, Lease-Purchase Financing for Community
Development, 12 ECON. DEV. & L. CENTER REP. 28 (Fall 1982) (examples of and
models for community economic development efforts paid for through lease-purchase
financing agreements); Nation's Municipalities, supra note 62, at 7 (sale-leaseback
transactions perceived by municipalities as income generators "for capital construc-
tion or improving existing facilities").
See also Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16 (disallowance of deductions under ACRS
for townhouses sold and leased with term of resale after one year and a day following
original sale at predetermined price); Martin, TAX SHELTER INsIDER 8 (May 1983)
(leasing a brood mare already in foal, thus providing risk to investor since no
guarantee of successful birth); Nicholson, CBOs and the New Tax Credits for Equip-
ment Leasing, 12 ECON. DEv. & L. CENTER REP. 33 (Spring 1982) (community based
organizations urged to take advantage of ACRS); Stewart, New Tax Incentives for
the Rehabilitation of Older and Historic Structures, 12 EcoN. DEv. & L. CENTER
REP. 21 (Winter 1982); Stewart, Tax-Exempt Organizations and Equipment Leasing
under the Tax Act of 1981, 12 ECON. DEv. & L. CENTER REP. 21 (Winter 1982); Tax
Breaks: Try Rent-a-Kid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1982, § 3 (Bus.), at 2, col. 5 (scheme
for rich families to "sell" their children to poor families and lease them back); New
Design at GM, supra, note 14 (unique arrangement of sale of option to buy with lease
for use to seller).
97. See, e.g., Leasing City Hall: That's the Latest Twist in Municipal Financing,
63 Barron's, May 16, 1983, at 39, col. 1 ("tax-shelter bandwagon"); A Tax Bill that
Imperils Historic Preservation, Bus. WK., Oct. 24, 1983, at 153, col. 1 (3,000 to
4,000 historic rehabilitations will be completed in 1983, "unless they, too, are
pinched off by the loophole-closers"); Tax-Leasing Twist, supra note 9, at 57 ("tax-
exempt organizations are creating deductions out of thin air by selling investors
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Means Committee 8 and in the Senate Finance Committee during the
1st session of the 98th Congress."' Action prior to the 1984 elections is
not expected, 00 but it is unlikely that this financial and social issue
will disappear.' 0' The questions presented by these transactions and
addressed by the Congressional committees will now be discussed in
detail.
something that does not actually exist"); Leasing Tax Breaks Curbed, CONG. INDEX
(CCH) (July 29, 1983) ("bill to substantially curtail the tax advantages to private
investors of leasing property and equipment to tax-exempt entities"); Ways and
Means Votes Curbs on Use of Leasing Tax Breaks, CONG. QUART., July 30, 1983, at
1539, 1540, col. 1 (rehabilitation tax credits disallowed if leasing arrangement is with
a tax-exempt entity using tax-exempt industrial development bonds to finance deal,
to prevent "'double-dipping' or even 'triple-dipping' at the tax-payer's expense");
Pickle Introduces Bill to Restrict Sale-Leasebacks by Tax-Exempt Entities, 11 Hous.
& DEV. REP. (BNA) 11, 11-12 (July 6, 1983) (the legislation is intended "to stop one of
the most unusual, ingenious, and costly tax shelters that we've seen in years")
(quoting Rep. Pickle); Ferris, Ways and Means Committee Plans Combination of
Tax Bills Designed to Close Loopholes, 223 Weekly Bond Buyer, Sept. 6, 1983, at 1,
col. 1 (H.R. 4170 characterized as "combination loophole closing bill" incorporating
measures to restrict use of private-purpose industrial development bonds and single-
family mortgage revenue bonds, as well as increases in taxes on life insurance
companies and sharp curtailment of sale-leaseback transactions by tax-exempt enti-
ties).
98. H.R. 3110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also Ways and Means Votes
Curbs On Use of Leasing Tax Breaks, CONG. QUART., July 30, 1983, at 1539, col. 1
(interest in proposed legislation attracted so many lobbyists that House Ways and
Means Committee voted unanimously to meet in rare closed session to mark up House
bill, which was approved on July 27, 1983).
99. S. 1564, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
100. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 11. The House bill has been
merged into a comprehensive revenue package for the second session of the 98th
Congress. While the House Ways and Means Committee states that this bill is
primarily intended to reform and simplify the present tax system, it further notes that
"the overall revenue effect of the bill is to increase revenues by $2.31 billion in fiscal
year 1984, $2.33 billion in fiscal year 1985, and $3.43 billion in fiscal year 1986." Id.
at 8. See 21 TAX NOTES 528 (Nov. 7, 1983) (four panelists, including an assistant U.S.
Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, three representatives to Congress, and a tax
counsel to Senate Finance Committee, agreed there would be no passage of tax
legislation in 1984 due to lack of bipartisan action in election year, and that 1985
would be too late for any such legislation to help federal deficit).
101. See, e.g., Amendment to Sale-Leaseback Bill Will Allow Continued Use of
Rehab Tax Credit With IDBs, 11 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 48-49 (June 20, 1983)
(Administration concerned by mounting evidence of leasing activity which it believes
has tremendous potential for causing unanticipated federal revenue losses and be-
lieves corrective measures should be enacted along the lines suggested by the bill)
(citing Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy John E. Chapoton); Dole Intro-
duces Bill to Restrict Sale-Leaseback Transactions, 11 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 89
(July 4, 1983) (Senate bill needed to "prevent the enormous end run on the federal
Treasury that has been attempted through the use of long-term tax-exempt lease
financing") (quoting Sen. Dole, chairman of Senate Finance Committee); Focus on
Leasing, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1983, at D2, col. 3 ("[j]ust as the Navy is doing with
leased ships, Mr. Pickle contends, local governments also can shift up to 30 percent of
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III. Policy Considerations
The principal motivation for legislation limiting the use of sale-
leaseback transactions by tax-exempt entities is curbing revenue losses
to the United States Treasury. 102 The Congressional committees, how-
ever, have focused on several tax policy issues. 0 3 These include: (1)
economic issues affecting all tax-exempt entities participating in sale-
acquisition costs to the Federal Treasury in the form of lost tax revenues"); Note,
Municipal Sale-leasebacks Face Restrictions, TAX SHELTER INSIDER 8 (Aug. 1983)
(Pickle claims sale-leaseback transactions by local governments and tax-exempt enti-
ties which own $2 trillion worth of property are a "perfectly legal tax shelter that
could double the federal deficit within a few years").
102. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 49
[T]he federal budget is in no condition to sustain the substantial revenue
loss resulting from lessing [sic] to tax-exempt entities, which will certainly
increase as more tax-exempt entities, financial entities, and tax-oriented
investors learn how to take advantage of the tax system in that way.
Nothing is accomplished to reduce budget deficits when spending cuts are
matched or exceeded by revenue losses.
Id. The bill provides a chart indicating that Title I Tax-Exempt Entity Leasing
Provisions will generate $683 million in revenue in 1984, escalating each year until
nearly $5 billion is generated in 1988. Id. at 49-50.
See How Cities Are Selling Tax Write-Offs, Bus. WK., April 5, 1982, at 95, col. 1
("in light of dire federal budget troubles, it remains to be seen whether Washington
will smile on the innovations [of tax-exempt entity use of sale-leasebacks] if they
bring large tax losses to the Treasury"); Ways and Means Votes Curbs On Use of
Leasing Tax Breaks, CONG. QUART., July 30, 1983, at 1539, col. 1 ("[c]onservative
estimates show that the federal government could lose $15 billion in revenues over
the next five years from use of the device"); Amendment to Sale-Leaseback Bill Will
Allow Continued Use of Rehab Tax Credit With IDBs, 11 Hous. & DEV. REi. (BNA)
48-49 (June 20, 1983) (Congressional Budget Office estimate of $2 trillion worth of
property owned by governments and tax-exempt organizations, led bill's sponsor,
Rep. Pickle, to state: "it is conceivable sale-leaseback arrangements could double the
federal deficit within a few years"); Dole Introduces Bill to Restrict Sale-Leaseback
Transactions, 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 89 (July 4, 1983) (restrictions on leasing
could be basic part of tax package Senate Finance Committee drafting in accordance
with mandated revenue increase in fiscal year 1984 budget resolution, Dole indi-
cated; Treasury predicts sale-leaseback transactions may deprive federal government
of several billions of tax dollars); Sale-Leaseback Bill Clears House Tax Panel With
New Transition Rules, IDB Ban, 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 174 (August 1, 1983)
("House staff estimate the bill's provisions could raise roughly $2.5 billion to $3
billion over the next two years and the funds could be counted toward the $73 billion
revenue increase called for in the fiscal 1984 budget resolution"); Growth of Tax-
Exempt Financing Stirs Battle on Revenues and Rights, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, §
2, at 37, col. 4 (reason for flurry of legislative activity, critics say, is huge federal
deficit; "[t]here wouldn't be so much activity if all members of Congress weren't
looking so hard for additional revenues") (quoting Heather Ruth, executive director
of the Public Securities Association).
103. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 12-14; DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564,
supra note 1, at 12-16; DEscFUrioN OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 62-65; TAX
ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 22-27.
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leaseback transactions, such as lack of economically "neutral" condi-
tions making ownership of property less favorable than leasing; the
"indirect federal subsidy" created by tax-exempt entities indirectly
receiving the benefits of depreciation deductions, investment credits
and deductions for interest and other expenses ordinarily unavailable
to tax-exempt entities; and, if such a subsidy is to be granted, whether
leasing arrangements are an efficient method of providing federal
assistance to tax-exempt entities; (2) issues facing governmental enti-
ties in particular, such as budgetary distortions caused by shifting
federal agency capital and operating costs to the Treasury and "pri-
vatization" of public services in transactions not involving net leases;
and (3) the generally negative public perceptions created by the sale of
highly visible assets, particularly by tax-exempt entities. 0 4 This sec-
tion will examine these tax policy considerations.
A. Economic Issues of Neutrality, Subsidy and Efficiency
The neutrality principle examines whether tax-exempt entities, like
taxpaying corporations or syndications, should be able to enjoy the
benefits of tax deductions. 0 5 When a tax-exempt entity uses property
through a sale-leaseback transaction or similar arrangement, reduced
rents pass depreciation deductions and investment credit incentives
from the owner of the property to the tax-exempt entity. 10 Since tax-
exempt entities would not otherwise qualify for these tax benefits, the
lack of neutrality of the current tax structure is a powerful economic
motivation for leasing property rather than owning. The Committees
recommend that in order to reduce or eliminate this tax-driven advan-
tage to leasing over purchasing, depreciation deductions be decreased
and denial of ITCs to tax-exempt entities be more strictly enforced.10
7
104. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12-16; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at
22-27.
105. TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 23-24. The Joint Committee maintains that
there are critics of its policy, as expressed in the final bills produced, who believe that
tax-exempt entities should be eligible for the benefits of accelerated depreciation and
ITC. Id. The "principle of neutrality" is offered in rebuttal to demonstrate that any
such tax benefit for tax-exempt entities would need to be balanced by tax burdens.
id.
106. Id.
107. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12-13; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 12; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 27-28. Neutrality is also an issue
where a governmental unit that might have otherwise issued bonds at a tax-exempt
interest rate to purchase property finds the tax-subsidized financing rate of a sale-
leaseback transaction to be lower. TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 23. Thus, tax-
exempt entities are driven to lease by the advantage given them through their tax-
exempt status and, in this way, the tax code is not neutral but in fact creates a
distortion in the after-tax price of capital in favor of leasing. Id.
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Since sale-leaseback transactions allow pass-through of tax benefits
such as depreciation deductions and investment tax incentives to tax-
exempt entities which are otherwise ineligible for these tax benefits,108
the federal government indirectly subsidizes the operations of tax-
exempt entities engaging in these transactions. 10 The Committees
believe that this supplies an excessive and unregulated tax benefit to
participants. " 0
While these leasing arrangements are legal under the present tax
structure and are an important form of financial assistance to tax-
exempt entities, the Committees argue that sale-leasebacks are ineffi-
cient vehicles for the provision of federal revenues."' The structural
complexity presently demanded of sale-leasebacks, and the danger of
recharacterization by the IRS, are perceived as making the transaction
costs extremely high, which in turn inflates rental payments by the
tax-exempt entities and reduces the benefits derived.1 2
B. Governmental Entity Issues of Budgetary Distortions and
Privatization
The Committees argue that sale-leaseback transactions by govern-
mental units distort the governmental budgetary process."13 Transfers
of expenses from capital "purchasing" budgets to current "operating"
budgets disguises the long-term nature of the lease commitment, thus
reducing accountability.' "4 The costs of leasing property are shifted
108. TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 22. See also DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra
note 1, at 62 (it is a "fundamental principle that the tax system exists to collect from
taxable entities, not to make payments to tax-exempt entities").
109. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 12.
110. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 65.
111. Id.
112. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 13; DEsCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 13; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at 65. The committees
list "lawyers, investment bankers, leasing companies, and other agents or investors"
as the parties most likely to siphon off the benefits granted by the tax code and which
should flow through to the lessee as lower rents. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra
note 1, at 13. See Nation's Municipalities, supra note 62 ("enormous 'transaction cost'
associated with sale-leaseback deals-legal fees, appraisals, engineering studies and
more").
113. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 13; DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564,
supra note 1, at 14; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 25. Since all state and local
governments are tax-exempt entities for federal income tax purposes, combined with
their enormous holdings of property, they represent a large percentage of the poten-
tial drain of revenue loss to the U.S. Treasury through leasing. Id. at 26-27.
114. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 13-14; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 12; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 25; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 64-65. See also supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of accounting issues in sale-leaseback transactions.
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from agency budgets to the federal Treasury through the indirect
federal subsidy."15 Control normally exercised through the appropria-
tions process is lost as leasing replaces direct outlays with indirect tax
benefits which do not require specific appropriations. "6 This makes it
difficult to evaluate the amount, recipient, and ultimate use of the
assistance provided. If the disbursement of funds is also shifted from
the agency's procurement account to another account, such as opera-
tions and maintenance, then scrutiny and control are further re-
duced. 117
Privatization of public sector services is defined by the Joint Com-
mittee as the present federal policy of involving private parties in
traditional areas of public services in an effort to provide these services
more economically."" The Committee cites critics who believe that
115. Public borrowing is subject to many legal controls which vary with the form
of debt incurred. These controls are a consideration of municipalities choosing be-
tween various cash-generating financing devices. For instance, municipal debt limits
may be avoided under the current financing and tax structures by shifting costs
within a governmental budget. There is a division of authorities on whether property
should be valued at its full value where the debt ceiling is set by a specified ratio of
debt-to-property value. Compare State v. Spring City, 123 Utah 471, 260 P.2d 527
(1953) (bonds issued in excess of debt limit were void) with People v. Doyle and
Associates, Inc., 374 Mich. 222, 132 N.W.2d 99 (1965) (lease-back agreement held to
violate constitutional limits on county borrowing power) and Breslow v. School
District of Balwin Tp., 408 Pa. 121, 182 A.2d 501 (1962) (holding debt ceilings
controlled by assessed values, not by generally higher real value). For a summary of
limitation standards see Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52
IOWA L. REV. 863 (1967); Note, Municipal Debt Limitations in Pennsylvania, 15
VILL. L. REV. 612 (1970).
116. DESCRI TION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 14; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 12; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 25; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 64-65.
117. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 14-15. The Joint Committee argues
that the appropriations process provides limited and controllable federal aid to tax-
exempt entities, above and beyond their tax exemption, adjustable to current priori-
ties from year to year. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 13. Control is
further derived, the Committee argues, through a record of federal assistance
through appropriations, while tax benefits are merely a non-payment type of benefit
with no record created. Id. Appropriations can, moreover, be debated and decided
in a political forum in order to best reflect community needs. DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
4170, supra note 1, at 65.
118. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 14; TAX ASPECTS, supra note 1, at
24. This concept is a key example of the sharp reversal of the Reagan Administration
on the issue of leasing. See, e.g., Lamm, Comments: Public Resource Management
under the Reagan Administration, in URBAN LAND POLICY FOR THE 1980s, THE
MESSAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 91, 96-100 (G. Lefcoe ed. 1983)
(Reagan Administration has reversed its position with respect to the four critical
services derived from leasing: (1) purchasing (will seldom be any greater advantage
available to a private, taxpaying lessor than to governmental agency with large
procurement budget); (2) financing (in most cases, particularly on federal level,
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the cost advantages of privatization derive from the "greater expertise
of private providers, as well as their ability to bypass negotiations
with public labor unions, requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act, facil-
ity design or other criteria specified by public agencies."", Private
providers are also credited with being able to avoid "delays in obtain-
ing financing through public budgeting processes.' 20 The Committee
refutes these contentions by maintaining that "relative expertise in the
supply of services is irrelevant in certain leasing transactions," particu-
larly where there is no change in the responsibility for providing
services. 121
C. Public Perceptions
Federal or other governmental units participating in the "selling of
tax-write offs" where "large lessors are able to reduce their tax pay-
ments to the Treasury by engaging in leasing transactions" are per-
ceived by the Committees as contributing to a negative public impres-
sion and possibly leading to "lower taxpayer compliance."' 1 2 This
government's credit rating is excellent); (3) operating and maintaining (contract for
these services would probably be possible); and (4) reselling costs (unique property
will most likely not be sold). Id.
Conversely, the Joint Committee concedes that with property such as equipment
and most vehicles, which are standardized in design and easily moved, the lease term
will generally be short and may be cost-effective for government agencies. Id. While
financing remains the crucial element, the services of purchasing and reselling are
provided better by private lessors, thus making short-term lease situations strong
candidates for sale-leaseback transactions in the Committee's view. Id. For a discus-
sion of the efficiency of tax-exempt financing as a subsidy and allocation of funds, see
Comment, Tax Exempt Financing of Health Care Facilities as a Component of the
Market Approach to Health Care Cost Containment, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 603,
652 n.300 (1983).
119. DEscPrIoN OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 14. This issue highlights the fact that
the Administration has dropped its attempt to privatize public services and reduce
the role of the federal government in local activities. It is interesting to note in this
regard that this argument was dropped by the House Ways and Means Committee
when the report on H.R. 4170 was prepared. See DESmrIIoN OF H.R. 4170, supra
note 1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 26; DEscRIrIoN OF H.R. 4170, supra note 1, at
65; DEscRTIrroN OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 12; DEsclrIION OF S. 1564, supra
note 1, at 14. See also A Tax Bill That Imperils Historic Preservation, Bus. WK., Oct.
24, 1983, at 153, col. 1 ("[t]he trouble is, a sale of any true historic property is a
disadvantage to the public in the long run") (quoting Richard M. Rosan, president of
the Real Estate Board of New York, arguing for leasing over complete sale); Nation's
Municipalities, supra note 62, at 7 ("there is a sticky public policy question associated
with 'selling off our assets-why should taxpayers see the facilities they paid for sold
off, and then have to pay rent to utilize them?' ") (quoting Philip E. Aarons,
president of New York City's Public Development Corporation).
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issue is particularly problematic where sale-leasebacks are perceived
as taking advantage of tax loopholes which allow federal subsidies to
flow to such highly visible groups as private universities,12 3 specific
political subdivisions such as New York City,' 24 and foreign govern-
ments and persons. 125
The general use of these transactions in so many various forms gives credence to the
opposing view that a properly explained and publicized sale-leaseback of a controver-
sial property can succeed. See How Cities Are Selling Tax Write-Offs, Bus. WK.,
April 5, 1982, at 95, col. 1 (even though sale-leaseback deals could arouse citizen
concern about private ownership of public facilities, particularly if viewed as a
means of borrowing without voter approval, city officials remain fairly optimistic,
since all it might take to keep creating the deals is "a little bit of a public relations
campaign") (quoting Robin W. Dougherty, Philadelphia's Assistant Director of Fi-
nance); Harris, Wanna Buy The Brooklyn Bridge? 129 FORBES, March 15, 1982, at
59, col. 1 (City Manager of Oakland, California defused "political powder keg" of
sale-leaseback of city's civic auditorium and museum by spending "many an hour"
explaining the deal, which was the only hope of preserving and renovating the
structures); Pitfalls of City Sale-Leaseback Deals Include Tax Violations, Political
Pressure, 10 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 1134 (May 23, 1983) (people suspicious of
sale-leaseback transactions have made receiving approval from review boards diffi-
cult. Such transactions are expected, however, to remain a part of governor's capital
plan) (quoting Jeffrey Apfel, New York Governor's office).
123. See, e.g., Tax-Leasing Twist, supra note 9, at 57 (Bennington College sale-
leaseback of $8.5 million campus to limited partnership of alumni described as
"typical"; also notes Towson State University arrangement to use sale-leaseback
transaction to finance new dormitories); College Leasing Deals Are Target of Pro-
posal to Clamp Down on 'Costly Tax Shelters', 26 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 13 (June
29, 1983) ("[t]his case is particularly offensive in that the tax benefits being sold are
attributable to property that was paid for with federal grant money") (quoting
President Reagan in his veto message of legislation proposed to enable North Carolina
art school to enter sale-leaseback transaction).
But compare this position with that of the National Association of Independent
Colleges and Universities and the American Council on Education, calling for refine-
ment of the proposed legislation to allow "economically productive transactions"
while barring "sterile transactions" that are "productive of nothing but tax benefits."
College Leasing Deals Are Target Of Proposal to Clamp Down on 'Costly Tax
Shelters', 26 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 13 (June 29, 1983). Seven other national
education groups endorsed this statement, including the National Association of
College and University Business Officers, Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universi-
ties, and the Association of State Colleges and Universities. Id.
124. Nation's Municipalities, supra note 62, at 7 ("[t]he Treasury Department
views this as a potential problem and wants to nip it in the bud . . . [i]f they take
away the benefits, I think it will hurt cities") (quoting Jack Freeman, consultant to
New York City on sale-leaseback transactions). A noted exception that granted the
New York City Convention Center. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (Sen.
Moynihan (D. N.Y.) proposed amendment to proposed federal legislation to provide
additional time for closing Convention Center deal). See also County Officials Op-
pose Sale-Leaseback Bill,. Further Curbs on Tax-Exempt Bonds, 11 Hous. & DEV.
REP. (BNA) 182 (Aug. 1, 1983) (members of National Association of Counties
adopted resolutions "opposing any new or additional restrictions on sale-leaseback
transactions ...calling for federal legislation authorizing a comprehensive survey
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IV. Recommendations
The use of sale-leaseback transactions by tax-exempt entities wish-
ing to maximize their budgets while continuing to maintain services
and make needed infrastructure improvements is predominately an
issue of tax policy. The search for politically acceptable ways to
reduce the federal deficit is bringing these tax policy questions to
renewed prominence. Legislators desiring to curb the use of sale-
leaseback transactions by tax-exempt entities should recognize, how-
ever, that the economic conditions which brought tax-exempt entities
and investors together in these transactions are still present.
The sale-leaseback is a viable and important financing instrument
for tax-exempt entities trying to maintain service quality despite re-
duced federal funding. 26 While Congress should permit sale-lease-
and increased funding for infrastructure needs"); State Legislative Group Adopts
Policies on Government Leasing, Tax-Exempt Bonds, 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA)
281 (Aug. 29, 1983). Members of the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) adopted resolutions limiting its support of the congressional plan to those
measures designed to curb specific abuses of leasing yet preserving the right to use the
financial device as a means of encouraging economic growth. Id. The NCSL specifi-
cally
opposes changes to federal law that would make depreciation schedules for
assets leased by governments longer than schedules for private industry,
provided the sale of tax benefits is not the sole motive for a transaction.
NCSL said it would support lease transactions that generate new invest-
ment from new construction or substantial rehabilitation, but would favor
restrictions on deals that do not reinvest proceeds in the projects or which
are intended to refinance existing assets.
Id.
125. See, e.g., DESCRI'rION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 16; DESCRIPTION OF H.R.
3110, supra note 1, at 14; TAx ASPECTS, supra note 1, at 16-17; DESCIPrIoN OF H.R.
4170, supra note 1, at 61. The Committees find justification for the use of sale-
leaseback tax benefits if the foreign entity is taxable by the U.S. Treasury on the total
income generated by property leased from a U.S. lessor. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4170,
supra note 1, at 61. They view as a federal subsidy to a foreign entity, however,
situations in which only a very small proportion of the income is taxable by the U.S.,
or if the entity is exempt by virtue of doing no business in the U.S. DESCRIPTION OF S.
1564, supra note 1, at 16. Policy considerations provide greater justification for
allowing the use of these tax benefits where goods are U.S.-produced, since these
benefits "might be justified as an export incentive." Id. Clearly, this would not apply
for leases of foreign-produced goods. See also Boeing and Others Fight Moves by
Congress to End Big Tax Advantages on Jet Leasings, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1983, at
33, col. 4 (outlining impact of legislation when sale-leaseback transactions foster
overseas sale by U.S. manufacturers; Boeing affected by possible loss of sales account-
ing for $900 million in lost tax revenues to U.S. Treasury); cf. TAx ASPECTS, supra
note 1, at 25-26 ("[i]n the event of war, the interests of the lessor and the defense
agency might differ considerably about the deployment of the property," leading to
protracted contract litigation as to rights and obviously posing a serious threat to
national defense).
126. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 46, at 63 ("[i]t is a truism in tax law that when
taxpayers devise new forms of transactions that combine economic and tax advan-
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back transactions, it should prescribe specific guidelines governing
their use. 12 7 While this financial device has flourished for decades
without guidance from Congress or the IRS, this has only been at high
cost 128 and risk. 129
Legitimizing sale-leaseback transactions between certain tax-
exempt entities and taxpayers under carefully designed and imple-
mented guidelines will enable Congress to resolve the issues raised by
the expanding use of this financial device.130 With certainty of finan-
cial and tax consequences as the centerpiece of a series of tests to be
tages while avoiding the tax disadvantages usually associated with such a transaction,
the government will seek to deny those advantages and recatagorize the transac-
tion"); Amendment to Sale-Leaseback Bill Will Allow Continued Use of Rehab Tax
Credit With IDBs: Cities Protest, 11 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 48-49 (June 20, 1983)
("Everytime we get creative, the Treasury Department wants to close down the
whole program") (quoting Vincent J. Thomas, mayor of Norfolk, Va.). These re-
marks were made as part of a resolution adopted without debate at the 1983 U.S.
Conference of Mayors meeting in Denver opposing this proposed legislation. The
resolution criticized the legislation as "injurious to the economic development activi-
ties and prospects of cities, jeopardizing important infrastructure investments and
traditional service contracts and imposing additional burdens on already strained city
budgets." N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1 ("[w]e have found [through a sale-
leaseback with option to repurchase in 30 years] a creative and prudent solution to
the problem of the center's cost overruns") (quoting William J. Stern, chairman of
New York State's Urban Development Corporation, which is building the New York
City Convention Center).
127. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. The court decisions have
provided little guidance, and the IRS audit guidelines are not a neat body of rules for
formation of sale-leaseback transactions, but serve merely as a method for IRS
internal evaluation in suspect cases. For proposals to modify the current general laws
and tax regulations of sale-leaseback transactions, see Burke, Why Some Sale and
Leaseback Arrangements Succeed While Others Fail, 26 J. Tax'n 130 (1967); Fuller,
supra note 46; Harmelink & Schurtz, supra note 25; Kaster, Tax Criteria for Struc-
turing Sale-Leasebacks, 9 REAL EST. REV. 39 (Fall 1979); Morris, Sale-Leaseback
Transactions of Real Property-A Proposal, 30 TAx LAW. (A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n) 701
(1977); Schurtz, supra note 33; Note, Problems of Judicial Interpretation of Real
Estate Sale and Leaseback Taxation: Description, Analysis, and Proposed Revision,
33 TAx LAW. 237 (1979); Note, supra note 13; note 124 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for discussion of transaction costs
of sale-leaseback transactions.
129. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text for discussion of financial and
tax consequences of a successful audit by the IRS.
130. As a guide for promulgating legislation regulating sale-leaseback transactions
by tax-exempt entities, Congress could use the rules that existed governing safe-
harbor leases. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) (1976); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., ANALYSIS OF SAFE-HARBOR LEASING (Joint Comm.
Print 1983); DEPRECIATION GUIDE, supra note 4, at 133; TAX HANDBOOK, supra note
4, at 2006. Safe-harbor leases were technically sham sale-leaseback transactions
that, if they met certain criteria, granted the purchaser the benefit of ACRS depreci-
ation and the ITC on the asset. DEPRECIATION GUIDE, supra note 4, at 133. These
controversial transactions were repealed for leases entered into after 1983, and thus
enjoyed a lifespan of only about two years. Id.
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promulgated by Congress and the IRS, the fundamental issues of
ownership, control, and accountability would become manageable
and straightforward.
The unintended, indirect federal subsidy currently allowed to tax-
exempt entities through sale-leaseback transactions 3' could become a
useful funding mechanism if pragmatic controls were contained in
clear federal guidelines. Sale-leaseback transactions should be limited
to carefully prescribed categories of tax-exempt entities which demon-
strate substantial gains in efficiency from the leasing process. Such a
limitation would reduce federal revenue losses, return purchasing
decisions to a more "neutral" position by making efficiency of produc-
tion the focus of analysis and encourage productive debate of leasing
and "privatization" versus ownership issues.
In addition, accounting rules should be incorporated into the new
guidelines to remove the distortions created in the capital and operat-
ing budgets of government agencies. 32 Further, the inefficiency of
high transaction costs associated with structuring a sale-leaseback
transaction' 33 would be sharply reduced by moving from the current
case-by-case approach to an administrative approach based on well-
131. See DESCRIPrION OF S. 1564, supra note 1, at 12; DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110,
supra note 1, at 12. A similar federal tax subsidy occurs in equity-financed invest-
ments in equipment. DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3110, supra note 1, at 12. ACRS and ITC
essentially allow, through expensing of the property, a write off of the entire cost of
the equipment in the year it is placed in service. See I.R.C. §§ 46 & 179 (1976). The
present value of the income from the asset will be equal to the present value of the
deductions and credit, thereby creating a tax exemption through expensing. If debt
financing is used to purchase equipment, the deductions allowed for interest pay-
ments are added to the above deductions creating a negative tax since the deductions
often exceed the income generated by the asset. DESCRIPTION OF S. 1564, supra note 1,
at 12. According to the Joint Committee, since tax-exempt entities are ordinarily
denied this subsidy, they must lease in order to benefit from it, and hence there exists
a "tax-driven advantage to leasing." Id. at 13.
132. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for discussion of the distor-
tions created in government agency budgets and the resulting loss of accountability
caused by the use of leasing rather than ownership. A properly constructed set of
guidelines could detail a separate filing and accounting system for leasing which
would require reporting of total procurement costs in an easily reviewable part of the
agency's budget. These costs could be broken down into total and yearly expendi-
tures, giving notice and recording the public and tax-exempt purposes served by the
property, and the amount of assistance assignable to various aspects of the property.
The guidelines should set forth rules which a tax-exempt entity must meet to be
eligible to engage in sale-leaseback transactions. In this way, the compliance with
these guidelines would ensure use of the device only in those situations deemed
appropriate by Congress.
133. See supra note 112 and accompanying text for discussion of the transaction
costs associated with sale-leasebacks.
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defined rules.13 4 Negative public perceptions, clearly manifested by
hostility to the sale of public facilities by governmental units and
Congressional fear of low taxpayer compliance due to a mistrust of the
tax system, would be greatly reduced by promulgation and consistent
administration of official guidelines.13 5
V. Conclusion
Sale-leaseback transactions have provided tax-exempt entities with
a useful method of raising revenue to maintain services despite gener-
ally reduced federal funding, mounting operating and maintenance
costs, scarcity of effective financing devices and the political difficul-
ties associated with raising taxes. While Congress has uncovered
abuses connected with use of this financial device, it should remain a
viable financing alternative for many qualified tax-exempt entities.
Rather than enact the proposed legislation making sale-leaseback
transactions virtually impossible for all tax-exempt entities, Congress
should compose specific guidelines for use by tax-exempt entities wish-
ing to undertake these transactions. The certainty resulting from such
guidelines will resolve the fundamental issues of ownership, control
and accountability, while allowing the use of sale-leasebacks to pro-
vide stability for the present and leverage for the future.
William L. Vallee, Jr.
134. See supra note 112 and accompanying text noting the loss of benefits to tax-
exempt entities from sale-leaseback transactions due to substantial transaction costs
incurred in the formation of these deals in the effort to avoid recharacterization by
the IRS. These costs would, however, be greatly reduced were these transactions
carefully defined and regulated through guidelines since fewer professionals would
be needed in the formation process.
135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text for discussion of the methods used
by tax-exempt entities to overcome any negative public perceptions associated with
the use of these transactions. Were Congress to sanction and control their use, sale-
leaseback transactions would become more acceptable to the public.
The theory that sale-leasebacks are fancy ways of borrowing money with-
out issuing mortgages reflects in large part the fact that mortgages are the
older and more familiar financing device. If sale-leasebacks had come
first, however, the IRS might approach mortgages with suspicion, assert-
ing that they are slick devices to sidestep the tax consequences of 'conven-
tional' sale-leasebacks
2 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 40.6.2, at 37
(1981).
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